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I. INTRODUCTION
Scott Nelson, an American monitoring systems engineer em-
ployed by a Saudi Arabian hospital, brought this action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
against the hospital, the Saudi Arabian government, and Royspec,
a Saudi government purchasing agency in the U.S, to recover dam-
ages for injuries allegedly received when Saudi police detained and
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tortured him.' He maintained that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA").2 The district court
held that his claims were not based on commercial activities con-
ducted by the Saudi Arabian government in the United States and
dismissed the action.3
On appeal, Nelson argued that the tortious acts committed
against him in Saudi Arabia were in retaliation for his performance
of a job-required duty.4 The tortious acts were so closely inter-
twined with the commercial activity of recruiting and hiring him in
the United States that they were based upon these commercial
acts.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held, reversed and remanded: the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's com-
mercial activity exception, where (1) recruitment of the engineer in
the United States was a commercial activity, and (2) the acts by
Saudi police, in retaliation for his performance of duties for which
he was recruited, provided a direct connection or nexus between
the acts and the commercial activity. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923
F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W.
3294 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1991)(No. 91-522).
This is the first court interpreting the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA to find a jurisdictional nexus between law
enforcement activity of a foreign government committed in its ter-
ritory and a commercial activity in the United States. The holding
that Saudi Arabia's law enforcement activities were based upon
commercial activities in the United States, and therefore not im-
mune under the FSIA, defeats the primary purpose of the Act.'
Because it requires a foreign nation to defend in a U.S. court offi-
cial acts of its police committed on its own territory, the Nelson
decision may provoke retaliation; foreign courts may extend juris-
diction over domestic U.S. law enforcement activities involving
their citizens. Additionally, the possibility of expensive litigation in
U.S. courts over the official acts of a foreign state employer against
an employee recruited in the U.S., may decrease employment op-
1. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed,
60 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1991)(No. 91-522).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
3. 923 F.2d at 1529.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For a discussion of the Act's purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
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portunities abroad for American citizens.
An alternative interpretation of the FSIA's commercial activi-
ties exception, and a better reading of the facts in Nelson, is that if
a sovereign's law enforcement activity in that state is the effective,
legal cause of the injury, the existence of a connection between the
law enforcement activities there and the sovereign's commercial
activities in the United States does not constitute a jurisdictional
nexus. In other words, when a state's police activities in its own
territory have an effective, legal cause in that territory, these activ-
ities giving rise to injuries cannot be based upon commercial activ-
ity in the United States merely because they are closely connected
or intertwined with it. This alternative interpretation accords with
the doctrine of restrictive immunity extant before the enactment
of the FSIA and serves the purposes for which the Act was written.
It preserves the respect for other nations' dignity which has been
an important element in the doctrine of foreign sovereign immu-
nity since Chief Justice Marshall gave it classic expression in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.7 It will spare foreign nations the
exorbitant expense of American litigation. Finally, it will maintain
the competitiveness of U.S. citizens seeking employment with for-
eign states.
II. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Chief Justice John Marshall, in The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, first clearly articulated the modern idea of foreign sov-
ereign immunity.8 Two owners of a vessel commandeered at sea in
1810 by the French Navy sought to attach the vessel when, a year
later, her French crew brought her into the port of Philadelphia.'
Appearing as a result of representations made by the French gov-
ernment, the United States Attorney suggested that the district
court quash the attachment and dismiss the owners' libel. 10 This
the district court did, holding that a public armed vessel of a
friendly foreign sovereign was not subject to the jurisdiction of
American courts.1" The disappointed owners appealed to the cir-
7. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
8. Daniel T. Murphy, Comment, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An
Historical Analysis, 13 VILL. L. REV. 583, 584 (1968).
9. 11 U.S. at 117-20.
10. Id. at 119.
11. Id. at 120.
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cuit court, which reversed, and the United States Attorney brought
the case to the Supreme Court.
12
Marshall began his opinion with an idea advanced by Emerich
de Vattel-a well-known eighteenth century writer on interna-
tional law-that a nation's sovereignty necessarily includes abso-
lute and exclusive control over all property and activity within its
territory.'" The jurisdiction of its courts, Marshall added, is a part
of this sovereignty, and any exception to it must result from the
nation's express or implied consent."' An instance of implied con-
sent, caused by the "mutual intercourse" and exchange of good of-
fices between independent sovereigns, is the universal practice of
exempting a sovereign's person from arrest or detention in a for-
eign territory. Another is that one sovereign's ships of war entering
the ports of a friendly nation are exempted from that nation's ju-
risdiction.'5 Although a sovereign may retract implied consent, un-
til that is done, the ordinary jurisdiction of the sovereign's courts
must be deemed waived."' The Exchange was therefore exempt
from a U.S. court's jurisdiction. The significance of Marshall's con-
ception of foreign sovereign immunity was its dependence on the
consent of the host or forum nation-a consent granted or with-
drawn for reasons of state policy.' 7
A. The Absolute Doctrine of Immunity
During the remainder of the nineteenth century and early in
the twentieth, however, courts seem to have been struck most by
The Exchange's "absolute" and "exclusive" phraseology.1 8
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the at-
tribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring ex-
tra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign
12. Id.
13. Id. at 136. See EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 172 (Northampton, Mass.,
S. Butler, 1820) (1758). See generally BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
JOHN MARSHALL 64-66 (1939) (indicating that the right of the sovereign to control exclu-
sively all persons and things within the territory of the state was an accepted idea in Mar-
shall's time and quoting Vattel).
14. 11 U.S. at 136.
15. Id. at 145-46.
16. Id.
17. Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immu-
nity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 164 (1981).
18. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS
§ 1.1, at 3 (1988).
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sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign
being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of
his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign terri-
tory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication,
and will be extended to him."0
Marshall's opinion became the foundation of the "absolute"
doctrine of sovereign immunity.20 Under this doctrine, a sovereign
was completely immune from another country's jurisdiction, re-
gardless of the subject matter or circumstances of a complaint, un-
less the sovereign consented to be sued.21 "Completely" meant just
that. For example, in The Parlement Belge,22 a British appellate
court held that a mail packet, 23 not a naval ship, owned by the
King of Belgium was immune from suit for damages by the owners
of an anchored, properly lighted tugboat with which she collided in
Dover Bay. Because the vessel was used for a public purpose, car-
riage of mail, respect for the independent sovereignty of its owner
required that Britain's courts decline to exercise jurisdiction.2 4
Faced with a similar question in an admiralty action brought
against a vessel owned and operated as a merchant ship by the
Italian government, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro,25 cited The Parlement Belge
and quoted extensively from The Exchange.0 It acknowledged
that Marshall's holding made no mention of merchant vessels, but
noted that, in Marshall's time, governments owned no merchant
vessels.2 7 The principles of his decision nonetheless extended to
19. 11 U.S. at 137.
20. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); DEL-
LAPENNA, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 3; Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 39 (1978); Murphy, supra note 8, at 587.
21. See D.P. O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 844 (2d ed. 1970); Murphy, supra note
8, at 583-84.
22. 5 P.D. 197 (1880).
23. A boat, usually a coastal or river steamer, that plies a regular route carrying passen-
gers, freight, or in this case, mail. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 844
(1988).
24. Id. at 217.
25. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
26. Id. at 571-73, 575.
27. Id. at 573-74.
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them. Ships owned and operated as merchant vessels by foreign
governments to foster their commerce or provide revenue served
public purposes and were therefore, like naval ships, public ves-
sels.2 8 It was perhaps appropriate that this admiralty case was the
high-water mark of the absolute doctrine when the American judi-
ciary considered foreign sovereign immunity.2 9
In The Exchange, the United States Attorney suggested that
the district court dismiss the action.30 The Supreme Court ap-
proved this executive directive."' Courts subsequently gave increas-
ing deference to executive suggestions of immunity.2 For example,
the Supreme Court in a 1943 opinion, Ex Parte Peru,33 acknowl-
edged that a friendly foreign state might claim immunity from suit
by either appearing itself or by presenting its claim to the Depart-
ment of State, which, if it recognized the claim, could certify this
to the Attorney General for presentation to the court.3" When the
Department of State recognized a claim of immunity, it became
the court's duty to dismiss the action "and remit the libelant to
the relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiations. '35
In Mexico v. Hoffman,36 a case involving a vessel owned but
not possessed by a foreign state, the Court carried deference to the
Department of State even further. It criticized liberal grant of im-
munity and held that in the absence of any previous recognition by
the Department of State and without a present recommendation of
immunity from the Executive, a court must, "in a matter so inti-
mately associated with our foreign policy and which may pro-
foundly affect it, not. . . enlarge an immunity to an extent which
the government, although often asked, has not seen fit to recog-
nize. ''3 7 This decision appeared to place the power to determine
immunity entirely in the Executive, leaving the courts as mere
28. Id. at 574.
29. See James Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing
Immune Transactions, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75, 86 n.43 (1984); Murphy, supra note 8, at
590.
30. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117-118 (1812).
31. Id. at 147.
32. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); Hill,
supra note 17, at 173-174; von Mehren, supra note 20, at 40.
33. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
34. Id. at 588.
35. Id.
36. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
37. Id. at 38.
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finders of fact."8
B. The Restrictive Doctrine of Immunity
In the nineteenth century, monarchs and states in Europe ex-
tended their activities beyond the traditional roles of defense and
maintenance of public order. This resulted in state ownership of
shipping companies, railroads, and various industries.39 The sover-
eign's increased involvement in the commercial realm invariably
lead to injuries and to contractual disputes between private indi-
viduals and the state-owned entities. Injured parties began to sue
the sovereign in these countries' courts. This eventually lead the
courts to distinguish between acta jure imperii, public acts, and
acta jure gestionis, private acts, and to abolish sovereign immunity
for the latter.40 As the century closed, courts in Italy and Belgium
applied the same distinctions to find jurisdiction over foreign
states sued by their citizens.4 ' The distinction crossed the Channel
and an English judge, Sir Robert Phillemore, gave it eloquent ex-
pression in 1873:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to au-
thorize a sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader,
when it is for his benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a
private subject to throw off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and
appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own benefit, and to the
injury of a private person, for the first time, all the attributes of
his character . . .42
This, however, was dictum. When Sir Robert, six years later, actu-
ally held that his court had the power to hear an action against a
vessel owned by the King of Belgium, he was promptly reversed by
38. See Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Ori-
gin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 9-10 (1976); Murphy, supra note
8, at 594-97.
39. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Competence of Courts
in Regard to Foreign States (1932), in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 473 (Supp. 1932)[hereinafter
HARVARD RESEARCH].
40. DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, § 1.2, at 5-6; Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of For-
eign States Before National Authorities: Some Aspects of Progressive Development of Con-
temporary International Law, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 477, 481-83 (1979).
41. HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 474; H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Juris-
dictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 227-28 (1951).
42. The Charkieh, 4 L.R.-Adn. & Eccl. 59, 99-100 (1873).
1991-921
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the court of appeals.43
A problem with the "public" and "private" labels as applied to
sovereign conduct is that a state, considered as an actor, is essen-
tially public and has no private purposes. 4" A judge of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice suggested a possible solution to this quan-
dary in 1923."1 He proposed to examine the nature rather than the
purpose of an act and determine whether a private citizen could
not ordinarily perform it."'
Despite the logical difficulties in distinguishing between types
of acts, the restrictive doctrine gained sufficient ground to warrant
its inclusion in a draft convention on foreign state immunity pub-
lished in 1932.17 Article 11 of the Harvard Research's Draft Con-
vention on the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States
recommends that jurisdiction of one state's courts should exist in
proceedings based on another state's business enterprises in the fo-
rum territory which private citizens of the host forum could also
conduct or when it is based on acts in the forum territory con-
nected with such enterprises. 8
Professor H. Lauterpacht presented the arguments against ab-
solute immunity and the restrictive doctrine in 1951. " He pro-
posed that the difficulties of distinguishing between public and pri-
vate or commercial acts would be avoided by adopting a rule of
immunity for foreign states that would subject them to the juris-
diction of a nation's courts exactly to the extent the nation sub-
43. The Parlement Belge, 4 P.D. 129 (1879), rev'd 5 P.D. 197 (1880).
44. See G. G. Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 117, 123-24 (1933); Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 224.
45. A. Weiss, Competence ou Incompetence des Tribunaux a l'egard des etats
etrangers, 1923 R.C.A.D.I. 525 (1923).
46. Id. at 546. See also Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 225 (suggesting that this test
"merely postpones the difficulty" of defining private acts, but not demolishing the test's
validity for defining public acts).
47. HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 39, art. 11, at 597.
48. Id. Article 11 reads:
A State may be made a respondent in a proceeding in a court of another
State when, in the territory of such other State, it engages in an industrial, com-
mercial, financial or other business enterprise in which private persons may
there engage, or does an act there in connection with such an enterprise wher-
ever conducted, and the proceeding is based upon the conduct of such enterprise
or upon such act.
The foregoing provision shall not be construed to allow a State to be made a
respondent in a proceeding relating to its public debt.
Id. at 597.
49. Lauterpacht, supra note 41.
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jects itself to its own courts' jurisdiction.5 0 Abolition of foreign sov-
ereign immunity would replace its restriction. Even while
proposing this revolution, however, Lauterpacht hastened to qual-
ify it with four "safeguards": (1) legislative acts and measures pur-
suant to them must remain immune; (2) executive and administra-
tive acts within a nation's own territory, including particularly
torts, should be immune; (3) governmental contracts should be
treated according to the forum's conflict of laws rules; and (4) dip-
lomatic immunity and that of warships should be preserved.5 1
Whether these safeguards relegate abolition to restriction is an in-
teresting query.5
C. From the Tate Letter to the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act
In a 1952 letter to the Attorney General, not without particu-
lar piquancy for law review authors,5" the State Department an-
nounced that henceforth it would follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity when considering foreign governments' re-
quests for immunity.54 It based this decision on its own survey of
the practices of foreign states, the inconsistency of U.S. granting
foreign states immunity while submitting itself to the jurisdiction
of the same courts in contract and tort actions, and the considera-
tion that "the widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary
a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts. '55 The Department
would recognize immunity with regard to sovereign or public acts
and deny it for private acts, but the letter gave no indication of
any criteria the Department might use to distinguish one from the
other.56 From 1952 to 1976 the Department of State's practice
50. Id. at 237.
51. Id. at 237-38.
52. For a suggestion that they do, see O'CONNELL, supra note 21, at 846-47.
53. The letter stated: "Furthermore, it should be observed that in most of the countries
still following the classical theory there is a school of influential writers favoring the restric-
tive theory and the views of writers, at least in civil law countries, are a major factor in the
development of the law." Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State, to the Acting Attorney-General (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL.
984 (1952).
54. Id. at 985.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 984. See also Hill, supra note 17, at 175-76; von Mehren, supra note 20, at 41
(pointing out the inadequacy of the Tate Letter in this respect).
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often did not comply with its prescription, particularly when inter-
national political pressures conflicted with the restrictive theory.57
Criticism from without,58 increasing uneasiness within the Office of
Legal Counsel over the suitability of the political branch to deter-
mine judicial questions, 59 and the burden of work imposed by re-
quests for immunity 0 led the Department to propose legislation
jointly with the Justice Department. On October 31, 1975 the two
departments submitted identical bills to the Senate and House of
Representatives." These became the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976.62
D. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Act attempts to provide a statutory framework within
which courts can independently determine sovereign immunity.6
57. See, e.g., Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk, 493 F.2d 1223 (1st
Cir. 1974) (State Department suggestion of immunity for Soviet fishing vessel); Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) (suggestion of immunity for
Indian government in admiralty action arising from contract charter for shipment of grain),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Yacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961)
(suggestion of immunity in admiralty in rem action against merchant vessel owned and op-
erated by the Cuban Government); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 215 A.2d
864 (Pa. 1966) (suggestion of immunity in action arising from Venezuela's unilateral cancel-
lation of contract for erection and operation, and confiscation of power plant). See also
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Gregory Haworth,
Foreign States Sued for Their Acts Abroad: A Uniform Analysis Under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 538, 551 (1982); Weber, supra note 38, at 16;
Monroe Leigh, Comment, Sovereign Immunity- The Case of the "Imias ", 68 AM. J. INT'L L.
280, 281 (1974); Murphy, supra note 8, at 600-01.
58. See Leigh, supra note 57, at 281.
59. Id. at 281-82.
60. "In the 12 years between 1960 and 1973 there were a total of 48 cases on which the
Department of State reached final decision. Immunity was suggested in 23 cases. During
that period there were an average of six cases pending at any one time." Victor Rabinowitz,
Can the Courts Cope with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 1 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 130, 134 n.13 (1980) (citing Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493
Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1973)).
61. von Mehren, supra note 20, at 44.
62. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611).
63. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988). For descriptions of the Act's structure see DELLAPENNA, supra note
18, § 1.3; Hill, supra note 17; George Kahale, III & Matias A. Vega, Immunity and Jurisdic-
tion: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 211 (1979); von Mehren, supra note 20; Melissa L. Werther et al., Note, Ju-
risdiction over Foreign Governments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign Sovereign
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It begins with a grant of immunity from the jurisdiction of United
States courts to foreign states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of the enactment of this
Act, a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter."'
Section 1605 lists the general exceptions to this initial grant. 5 The
first clause of the "commercial activities exception," contained in
section 1605(a)(2)" is the subject of the rest of this Note.
III. NELSON V. SAUDI ARABIA: THE COURT'S TREATMENT
A. The Facts
In Nelson v. Saudi Arabia7 the plaintiff alleged that his re-
sponsibilities at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh in-
cluded recommending modifications of existing equipment,
purchasing and installing new equipment, assuring "'compliance
with safety regulations,'" troubleshooting problems, and imple-
Immunities Act, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 119 (1986).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
65. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6616 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487].
66. Section 1605(a)(2) states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state [Clause 1]; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere [Clause 2]; or upon an act outside the territory
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States [Clause 3].
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). For analysis of the commercial activities exception, see DEL-
LAPENNA, supra note 18, §§ 3.6-3.10, 6.3-6.8; Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP L. Q.
302, 306-18 (1986); David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commer-
cial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440 (1983); Michael G. Cosby, Com-
ment, "Commercial Activity" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: To-
ward a More Practical Definition, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 295 (1982); Deborah Schloss, Note,
"Commercial Activity" in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 163 (1979).
67. 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Sept.
26, 1991)(No. 91-522).
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menting "'corrective action.' "68 On March 20, 1984, Nelson found
a dangerous grease valve in an oxygen line system which he
thought might endanger patients.6 9 He reported this safety hazard
to a Saudi government investigatory commission.70 On September
27, 1984, he was summoned to the hospital's security office and
taken to a jail cell where, he alleged, he was "shackled, tortured
and beaten" by Saudi government agents or employees, and im-
prisoned for thirty-nine days.7 1 He also alleged that his wife was
told by a Saudi government officer that her husband could be re-
leased if she "provided sexual favors. '7 2 Defendant Saudi Arabia
maintained, however, that Nelson's detention arose from the dis-
covery that he had submitted a false diploma from the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.73
B. The Court's Opinion
The court held that because the alleged acts taken by Saudi
Arabian government officials "resulted from and were directly at-
tributable" to Nelson's performance of the duties of the specific
post for which he was hired and recruited in the United States,
they were "based upon" this recruitment and hiring.74 It had previ-
ously determined that the recruitment and hiring constituted com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States as defined in the
Act.7 5 It therefore found that the district court had jurisdiction
under the first clause of section 1605(a)(2).7 6
Once it had decided that the recruitment and hiring of Nelson
68. Id. at 1530, 1535-36.
69. Appellant's Brief at 4, Nelson (No. 89-5981).
70. 923 F.2d at 1530.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1536.
74. Id. at 1535.
75. Id. at 1533. The Act defines commercial activity carried on in the United States
thus:
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or
a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an ac-
tivity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. . . . A
"commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" means
commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with
the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)-(e) (1988).
76. 923 F.2d at 1530.
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was a commercial activity, the court had to determine whether his
claims were "based upon" this activity." Jurisdiction would not
exist if all Nelson could maintain was that "but for" this activity
he would not have been in Saudi Arabia to be detained. Rather, a
jurisdictional "nexus" had to exist between the acts Nelson com-
plained of and the commercial activity.
78
Originated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,'7 this ap-
proach to the scope of the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) was
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation." A "nexus" is a
bond, link, or causal connection."1 It is a narrower reading of the
first clause's "based upon" language than the "doing business" test
(regardless of connection between business done and acts com-
plained of) enunciated in In re Rio Grande Transport, Inc.82 by a
district court in 1981. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the acts
Nelson complained of-detention and alleged torture by Saudi
government officials supposedly in retaliation for carrying out his
job-required duty to report safety hazards-were so "intertwined"
with his employment that the required nexus existed. 3 Because
the nexus existed, the action was, indeed, based upon commercial
activity carried on in the United States by Saudi Arabia.""
Here the court distinguished two cases. One of these, Grego-
rian v. Izvestia,85 it summarized without further comment." In
that case, the plaintiffs sued Izvestia, a Soviet government newspa-
per, alleging that Izvestia had published a libellous article about
them enabling two Soviet government commercial organizations to
77. 923 F.2d at 1534.
78. Id.
79. See Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S.
929 (1982); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 1980).
80. 730 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1984).
81. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1534.
82. 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). "[Tlhe first clause of § 1605(a)(2) appears
to be a broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction over the commercial activities of foreign
states similar to state-exercised long-arm jurisdiction." Id. The court found jurisdiction in
an action arising from a collision in the Mediterranean Sea involving a vessel, owned by an
Algerian state shipping corporation, bound from Algiers to Europe, because the corpora-
tion's worldwide shipping business had "substantial contact with the United States." Id.
The Vencedora court called this the "doing business test." 730 F.2d at 201.
83. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535.
84. Id.
85. 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
86. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535.
1991-92]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
avoid contractual obligations owed them.8 7 The plaintiffs argued
that the article was published in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity-sale and distribution of the newspaper in the United
States.8 They claimed the newspaper published the article with
the purpose of injuring them commercially. The court first noted
that section 1603(d)8" required that the determination of commer-
cial activity be made by reference to the nature of the transaction
or act rather than its purpose.90 It agreed with the United States
Statement of Interest that Izvestia's writing and publishing of arti-
cles were sovereign or governmental activities, and held that "the
governmental nature of Izvestia's publication and distribution
defeats plaintiffs' argument that its sale is sufficient to afford juris-
diction under Section 1605(a)(2)."91
The Nelson opinion's reference to Gregorian concludes, "[t]he
Court found that because Izvestia articles are 'official commentary
of the Soviet government' publishing and writing them 'constitutes
an activity whose essential nature is public or governmental.'
Hence, the libel claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction under Section 1605(a)(2). ' '92 Perhaps by oversight, no
mention is made of Gregorian's crucial holding that Izvestia's sales
were not commercial activity on which jurisdiction could be based.
That the Nelson court took this point, however, seems evident in
the next sentence of its opinion: "In the case of Nelson, however,
we find that the detention and torture of Nelson are so intertwined
with his employment at the Hospital that they are 'based upon' his
recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for employment at
the Hospital in Saudi Arabia."'93
The second case, Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp.,94
involved plaintiffs on a vacation tour whose names were on an un-
desirable aliens list compiled by Dominican Republic immigration
authorities.9 5 When they arrived in Santo Domingo aboard Domin-
87. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521.
88. Id.
89. In defining "commercial activity," section 1603(d) states, in pertinent part, "The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)(emphasis supplied).
90. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1521.
91. Id. at 1522.
92. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535.
93. Id.
94. 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 1373.
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icana Airlines, the national airline of the Dominican Republic, im-
migration officers denied them entry and, assisted by Dominicana
employees, forcibly placed them aboard a Dominicana flight to San
Juan, Puerto Rico.9 Alleging that Dominicana partially sponsored
the tour sold to them by Guzman, the Arangos brought an action
against Dominicana and other defendants in state court. 7 On re-
moval to federal court and subsequent dismissal of their claims
against Dominicana, the plaintiffs appealed."" The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed their appeal, but proceeded,
"in the interest of expediency . . . to offer [the district] court some
guidance in its further handling of these issues."9 9 First, the court
found that Dominicana's ticket sales and other airline operations
were "commercial activity" within the meaning of section 1603(d)-
(e). 100 Then it addressed Dominicana's argument that the plain-
tiffs' claims arose, not from this commercial activity, but from the
acts of the Dominican Republic's immigration officials who ex-
pelled the Arangos and from the involuntary, and thus non-com-
mercial, rerouting of the Arangos mandated by those officials. 1 '
The court found that Dominicana was not answerable to the com-
plaints of false imprisonment and of battery stemming from the
Arangos being forced aboard the Dominicana flight to San Juan by
Dominican Republic immigration officers, with the aid of Domini-
cana employees, and from their alleged "man-handling" while un-
dergoing this happy travel experience. 102
The focus of the exception to immunity recognized in
§ 1605(a)(2) is not on whether the defendant generally engages
in a commercial enterprise or activity, as an airline such as
Dominicana unquestionably does; rather, it is on whether the
particular conduct giving rise to the claim in question actually
constitutes or is in connection with commercial activity, regard-
less of the defendant's generally commercial or governmental
character.
Dominicana's actions in connection with the 'involuntary
re-routing' were not commercial. Dominicana was impressed into
service to perform these functions .... Dominicana acted
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Arango, 621 F.2d at 1373.
99. Id. at 1378.
100. 621 F.2d at 1379.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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merely as an arm or agent of the Dominican government in car-
rying out this assigned role, and, as such, is entitled to the same
immunity from any liability arising from that governmental
function as would inure to the government, itself."°3
The court found that the Arangos' other claims-for breach of con-
tract and warranty, failure to refund the price of the tour, and fail-
ure to warn of the list of undesirables which Dominicana knew the
Republic's immigration service maintained-arose directly from
the airline's commercial activity in the United States. 10 4 These
claims were not barred by foreign sovereign immunity. 0
5
The Nelson court summarized the facts in Arango and care-
fully noted that the battery and false imprisonment claims were
based on official acts while the breach of contract and other con-
tractual claims were based upon Dominicana's commercial activity
in the United States.0' It did not mention the basis of the Arango
court's distinction: that the focus of the section 1605(a)(2) excep-
tion is on whether the particular conduct occasioning the claim
constitutes or is in connection with commercial activity.
Obviously, the Nelson court believed that there was no con-
nection between the official acts perpetrated upon the Arangos,
and the commercial activity of the defendant in selling tickets and
travel cards.10 7 Instead, the battery and false imprisonment claims
of the Arangos were based upon an official activity of expulsion.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1605(a)(2)
A. Jurisdictional Nexus: A Misused Tool
The requirement that there be a jurisdictional nexus between
the acts giving rise to the complaint and a sovereign's commercial
activities in the United States for an action to be based upon sec-
tion 1605(a)(2) is a creation of the courts. 0 8 Like the requirement
of causal connection for tort liability, it is a limiting device.' The
nexus test is "necessary to satisfy both the congressional policy of
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 1379-80.
105. Id.
106. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535.
107. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535-36. See Matias A. Vega, International Decisions, Nelson
v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (1991).
108. See, e.g., Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1534.
109. Id.
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the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] and sound principles of
comity."",
The Nelson court applied the jurisdictional nexus test to a se-
quence of events which certainly were intertwined. It began with a
foreign state's commercial activity in the United States, and con-
cluded with that state's law enforcement activities in its own terri-
tory. Because this test appeared to fit, the court found that Nel-
son's grievances were based upon Saudi commercial activity in the
United States, thereby severing the shield of sovereign immunity
from Saudi law enforcement activity in its own territory."' In a
triumph of literalism, the court brandished a judicial tool fash-
ioned to implement the Act's establishment of the restrictive doc-
trine of soveriegn immunity. In so doing, it created an unnecessary
richness of embarrassments, and contravened Congress's intent in
adopting the Act.112
The jurisdictional nexus, like many sharp, double-edged tools,
can harm its user if wielded inappropriately. The Supreme Court
of the United States has invited the Solicitor General to brief the
position of the United States on Saudi Arabia's presently pending
petition for certiorari." 3 The State Department's strong interest in
this case indicates that judgement of one nation's police activities
on its own territory by the courts of another state is a matter of
international sensitivity." 4 Internal law enforcement activities are
precisely the public acts to which the restrictive doctrine grants
immunity. 15 Courts should refrain from using a judge-made tool
when its use defeats the purpose of the legislation it was designed
to interpret.
A better reading of the facts in Nelson is that the official acts
on Saudi territory arose from Mr. Nelson's activities at the Saudi
hospital. The circumstances of his arrival in Saudi Arabia were of
no greater relevance to the jurisdictional inquiry than were Domin-
icana's ticket sales and air carriage of the Arango plaintiffs which
lead to their unhappy encounter with immigration officials at
Santo Domingo. In both cases there was a "nexus" (i.e., a causal
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1536.
112. See Statement of Interest of the United States in Support of Rehearing and Sug-
gestion for Rehearing in Banc, Nelson (No. 89-5981) at 2-3 [hereinafter Statement of Inter-
est]; Vega, supra note 107, at 557.
113. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 112 S.Ct. 436 (1991).
114. Statement of Interest, supra note 112, at 2-3.
115. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 65, at 6605.
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connection) between the plaintiffs' grievances and a foreign state's
commercial activities in the United States, but in neither case was
this connection a jurisdictional nexus becausb the effective, legal
cause of the tortious official acts complained of arose in the foreign
nation itself. Determination of a legal cause, like the presence of a
jurisdictional nexus, is very much a matter of policy.11 Whether a
holding in Nelson that there was no jurisdictional nexus between
law enforcement activities in Saudi Arabia and Saudi commercial
activities in the United States best satisfies the "congressional pol-
icy of the FSIA' 17 requires examination of that policy.
B. Argument from Legislative Intent
Congress intended the Act to place the determination of
claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity in United States
courts, rather than in the executive branch."' Its aim was to "pro-
tect the rights of both foreign states and litigants" in the courts.'1 9
The drafters envisioned that courts would afford this protection by
determining claims under standards recognized by international
law and embodied in the Act.'
The principal standard embodied in the Act was the restric-
tive doctrine of immunity, particularly the exception from immu-
nity of states' commercial activities.'' The central purpose of the
restrictive doctrine, and the reason for the commercial activities
exception, is to balance justly the right of sovereign governments
to carry out their political and administrative functions free from
interference and the interest of private individuals conducting bus-
iness with these governments to have their legal claims heard in
their own countries' courts.'22 Congress clearly recognized that the
courts would have broad discretion in determining what was and
116. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984).
117. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1534.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1602; see also HR. REP. No. 1487, supra note 65, at 6606 ("A principal
purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the execu-
tive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immu-
nity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.").
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
120. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 65, at 6613.
121. Id.
122. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
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what was not commercial activity.123 Its intention to restrict immu-
nity to the sovereign or governmental acts of a foreign state cannot
have included a grant of discretion for courts to find such acts not
immune merely because they are tenuously connected to commer-
cial acts in the United States.'
Two relatively recent cases confirm that a foreign nations' ad-
ministrative and law enforcement acts should not be heard by
American courts. In the first, Tucker v. Whitaker Travel, Ltd.,12 5
plaintiffs, injured in a fall from a horse rented at a livery stable in
the Bahamas, complained of that government's refusal to investi-
gate the accident, to take action against the livery business opera-
tors involved, or to properly regulate horseback riding.'2  The
court held that the Bahamian government was immune from its
jurisdiction because the decisions not to investigate or regulate
were "peculiarly governmental" and not subject "to scrutiny in the
United States courts.'12
7
In the second case, Herbage v. Meese,'25 the court dealt with
claims of a British citizen who was convicted of mail fraud after
being extradited to the United States.2 9 The British citizen
claimed that British officials had illegally assisted in his extradi-
tion.'30 Noting that the acts complained of were "official govern-
ment functions classically belonging to the discretion of the execu-
tive, and classically immune from suit," the court held that
whether or not the acts were legal, it lacked jurisdiction under the
Act.13 '
123. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 65, at 6615. For an indication that courts have
faced this discretionary challenge with less than overwhelming enthusiasm see Callejo v.
Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta,
549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))("The FSIA has aptly been called a 'remarka-
bly obtuse' document, a 'statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive ques-
tions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has
during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the
federal judiciary.' "). No judge or commentator has yet improved on Sompong Sucharitkul's
understated elegance: "Sub-section (a) of Section 1605 is not altogether free of difficulties."
Sucharitkul, supra note 40, at 494.
124. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 65, at 6613.
125. 620 F. Supp. 578 (D.C. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 986 (1986).
126. Id. at 584.
127. Id.
128. 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 67.
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The sole significant difference between the facts in these cases
and those in Nelson is that in Nelson the sovereign acts are "inter-
twined" with a commercial activity in the United States by the
foreign nation. Here, surely, the private interest of the claimant
must give way to the right of a sovereign state not to have official
domestic acts of its law enforcement officers tried in a foreign
court. The restrictive doctrine, which the Act was intended to ef-
fect, suggests plainly that on this peculiar set of facts, a United
States court should not exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia.132
C. Argument from the History of the Restrictive Immunity
Doctrine
Inherent in the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity is a
balance between the need of states to carry out their essential gov-
ernmental functions free from the harassment and expense of law
suits and the just desire to allow private claimants the opportunity
to have their claims heard in their country's courts. 133 The doctrine
achieved this balance by distinguishing between a foreign state's
public acts and its private (or commercial) acts and by restricting
immunity to the former. Because all state acts can be classed as
"public" in their purpose, the doctrine required that courts ex-
amine the nature rather than the purpose of acts from which
claims arise.1 3 4
It does not appear that the courts or theorists whose combined
work produced the restrictive doctrine ever contemplated the with-
drawal of immunity for a state's law enforcement activities within
its own territory. Published in 1932, the influential Harvard Re-
search's Draft Convention on the Competence of Courts in Regard
to Foreign States included a list of activities with various coun-
tries' court decisions as to whether the activities were or were not
commercial. 13 5 Law enforcement activities were not on the list,
which included operating a railroad, leasing real property, carrying
on a government trading monopoly, buying arms, purchasing sup-
plies for army use, selling excess supplies, and purchasing goods to
132. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecinientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964); Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 237-38.
133. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Hill, supra note 17, at 171-72.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d); HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 597.
135. HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 39, at 609-11.
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be resold to nationals.'36 The authors annotated the list with ex-
tracts from foreign courts which had thus far considered claims
against other states arising from commercial or non-public acts:
none involved law enforcement activities.1 37 Section 1605 of the
Act uses the "based upon" language found in Article 11 of the
Draft Convention. It is difficult to believe that the authors of the
proposed convention intended that the immunity of a state should
be denied when the claim against it arises from law enforcement
activities in that state's own territory which happen to have a
nexus with the state's commercial activities in the forum country.
Professor Lauterpacht published his well-known article in
1951.138 It seems just to say that he represented the "cutting edge"
of the restrictive school at the time, since he proposed that states
be no more immune in the courts of other countries than they were
in their own.' 39 Even he, however, specified that the abolition of
the rule of immunity must be subject to safeguards, one of which
was:
[Tihere must be immunity from jurisdiction in respect of the
executive and administrative acts of the foreign state within its
territory, such as alleged unjustified expulsion or, generally, de-
nial of justice. In particular no action shall lie for torts commit-
ted by foreign states in their own territory.'40
His article cites no case or scholarly proposition that represents an
exception to this safeguard. Given his abolitionist position, Lauter-
pacht would not likely have missed the opportunity to bring such
authority to his readers' attention.
In 1955 Professor (as he then was) Edward D. Re, the author
of the Nelson opinion, published an article which left little doubt
about his support for the restrictive doctrine.' He carefully re-
ported and analyzed "progress" on the restrictive front in British
and American courts, remarking ruefully of one British case, "[f]or
those who wish to see a complete repudiation of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the Juan Ysmael case does not go far
136. Id.
137. Id. at 611-40.
138. Lauterpacht, supra note 41.
139. Id. at 237.
140. Id. at 237-38.
141. Edward D. Re, Judicial Developments in Sovereign Immunity and Foreign Con-
fiscations, 1 N.Y.L.F. 160 (1955).
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enough."142 Yet,
The English case of [Ysmael] cannot at all be regarded as a ret-
rogression in the development of sovereign immunity. On the
contrary, it continues the judicial trend to restrict the applica-
bility of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Surely, it should be
obvious to legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic that revo-
lutionary changes of position concerning doctrines that have ex-
isted for centuries cannot be expected overnight. 143
Like Lauterpacht, Professor Re surely would have drawn his read-
ers' attention to any court's exercise of jurisdiction in an action
arising from a foreign nation's law enforcement activities in its own
territory had a court ever done this.
The leading case in the era between the 1952 Tate Letter and
the 1976 passage of the Act was Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisa-
ria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,'4" involving a suit
to compel arbitration over the charter of a vessel transporting
wheat to Spain. The State Department made no recommendation
regarding the Spanish government's claim of immunity, thus leav-
ing the court to decide for itself whether, under the Tate Letter,
immunity should be granted. 14 5 Neither the nature test nor the
purpose test, the court thought, was an adequate criterion for de-
ciding whether acts were public or private."14 Because "[s]overeign
immunity is a derogation from the normal exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts and should be accorded only in clear cases,"' 47 the
court said it would be disposed to deny a claim for immunity not
recognized by the State Department "unless it is plain that the
activity in question falls within one of the categories of strictly po-
litical or public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally been
quite sensitive."" 8 The restrictive theory required the sacrifice of
private claimants' interests to international comity only if the acts
in question fell in these "strictly political or public" activities:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien,
142. Id. at 172 (citing Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Government of Indonesia, [1954] 3
W.L.R. 531 (Eng.)).
143. Id. at 173.
144. 326 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). For its significance, see Hill, supra note 17, at 181-83;
Murphy, supra note 8, at 601-02 (remarking on its "rather conservative" grants of
immunity).
145. 326 F.2d 354, 358-59 (1964).
146. Id. at 359-60.
147. Id. at 360.
148. Id.
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(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization,
(3) acts concerning the armed forces,
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity,
(5) public loans.'4 9
Commentators have noted that from 1964 until the passage of the
Act in 1976, courts considering claims of immunity on which the
State Department made no recommendations tended to follow Vic-
tory's lead in applying the restrictive doctrine.'
Plainly the restrictive doctrine in theory and in the courts'
practice prior to the Act never contemplated jurisdiction over
claims arising from a nation's law enforcement activities in its own
territory.
D. Arguments from Policy
1. Dignity
As a consideration in questions of foreign sovereign immunity,
dignity, if not altogether dead, is in dire disrepute.' Lauterpacht
despatched her decisively: "These strained emanations of the no-
tion of dignity are an archaic survival and .. .they cannot con-
tinue as a rational basis of immunity."'6 5 Others suggest that the
replacement of monarchs with soulless modern bureaucracies
makes her moot.'6 3 All unite in maintaining that when a nation
deigns to trade, its dignity is better preserved by submission to law
than by claiming superiority to it.'6 4
Despite her archaic, unfashionable robes, in this particular
case, dignity may demonstrate her utility. When Chief Justice
Marshall wrote his famous opinion in The Schooner Exchange, the
United States was a young, weak republic in a world of warring
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, § 1.2, at 8 n.44; Haworth, supra note 57, at
550-51 (maintaining that the only deviation from the Victory standard "occurred when the
judiciary deferred to recommendations from the executive that immunity be granted in par-
ticular cases" and providing a list); Hill, supra note 17, at 180 n.115.
151. See R. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 265, 271 (1982); Hill, supra note 17, at 165; Moses Aldrin
Kimuli, The Application of the Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign/State Immunity to Public
Corporations, 13 MELANESIAN L.J. 52, 76-77 (1985); Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 230-32.
152. Lauterpacht, supra note 41, at 231.
153. See Hill, supra note 17, at 165.
154. Id.
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monarchs. 156 Indeed, the Napoleonic Wars occasioned the case.'
Eager to establish the power of the federal government, and of his
court, at home, Marshall had great motivation to establish the
equality of sovereign states in the law and to emphasize the idea of
dignity in their relations with each other.'6 7 In 1812, neither Brit-
ain nor France, locked in a world war, hesitated to affront minor
states' dignity by commandeering their ships and impressing their
seamen.
58
Many of the world's nations are in positions analogous to that
of the United States when Marshall penned The Schooner Ex-
change, and the ideas of sovereignty, dignity, and the equality of
states before the law which sound so quaint and archaic to modern
American lawyers have real significance to these countries." 9 This
in no way invalidates the restrictive doctrine of immunity. As one
commentator has remarked, contracts designed to further the eco-
nomic growth of developing countries are not likely to be promoted
by policies that provide for their unenforceability.' 60 It does sug-
gest, however, that an unnecessary affront, such as requiring a
young, proud nation"' to submit to the jurisdiction of our courts
in an action arising from the law enforcement activities of its offi-
cials on its own territory, should be avoided.
In a country where dignity is at a discount and where torture
is reduced to a tort for which money damages are payable, it may
be more illuminating to equate denigration of national dignity with
unconscionable expense:
The object of the [foreign sovereign immunity] doctrine-to be
sure with some important exceptions-is to relieve the sovereign
of the burdens and indignities of civil litigation in a foreign fo-
rum; if the sovereign had to prove its entitlement to immunity
by preliminary litigation and had to undergo the burdens of dis-
155. See HENRY ADAMS, 2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE SEC-
OND ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1-54, 105-27 (Scribners, 1890); SAMUEL FLAGG
BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 138-58 (3d ed. 1950).
156. See ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 4 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 125-26 (1919).
157. Id.
158. See ADAMS, supra note 155; ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, 1 SEA POWER IN ITS RELA-
TIONS TO THE WAR OF 1812 141-282 (1918).
159. See Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976: Can They Coexist? 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 247, 278-80 (1989).
160. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 17 (1988).
161. Ibn Saud was pronounced King of the Hijaz on January 8, 1926, and he pro-
claimed the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. For a participant's account
of the formation of the Kingdom, see H. ST. JOHN PHILBY, SA'UDI ARABIA 265-91 (1955).
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covery, the purpose of immunity doctrine would be gravely un-
dermined. [The judge] could see that participation in pre-trial
discovery, American style, might be about as much of an indig-
nity for a foreign country as participation in a trial .... "'
Pre-trial discovery for the determination of jurisdiction appears in-
evitable under the Act, but requiring the sovereign defendant to
incur the costs of trial is truly adding injury to insult.163
2. Reciprocity
A further argument for declining to exercise jurisdiction in the
Nelson case is that it could lead to retaliatory or reciprocal exten-
sion of foreign jurisdictions to encompass the actions of American
law enforcement agencies whenever these acts have what the for-
eign courts perceive to be a jurisdictional nexus with some United
States government commercial activity in the forum country."" At
present the State Department uses the Act as its standard for de-
termining whether it should claim immunity in other nations'
courts."6 5 Even, therefore, when there is no retaliatory expansion of
foreign jurisdictions, the United States will only be able to claim
immunity in such a case if it adopts for itself a less exacting stan-
dard than it applies to others."66
3. Effect on Americans' Employment Abroad
If subject matter jurisdiction of United States courts encom-
passes claims by Americans employed by foreign states arising
162. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case,
49 NY.U.L. REV. 377, 415 (1974).
163. For a discussion of the burden of proof and discovery, see DELLAPENNA, supra note
18, §§ 9.3-9.4. On the burden of trial as perceived by non-Americans, consider:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he
can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to
himself; and at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers
there will conduct the case 'on spec' as we say, or on a 'contingency fee' as they
say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for their services but instead
they will take 40 per cent of the damages, if they win the case in court, or out of
court on a settlement. If they lose, the litigant will have nothing to pay to the
other side. The courts in the United States have no such costs deterrent as we
have . . . . All this means that the defendant can be readily forced into a settle-
ment. The plaintiff holds all the cards.
Smith Kline Ltd. v. Bloch, 1983 W.L.R. 730, 733 (Eng. C.A. 1982).
164. Statement of Interest, supra note 112, at 2-3.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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from law enforcement activities in these states which have some
jurisdictional nexus with the countries' commercial activities in the
United States, the attractiveness of American employees vis-a-vis
those from nations with narrower definitions of jurisdiction will
suffer. Why recruit a law suit?
It is worth noting that the British State Immunity Act,' that
of Australia' and the European Convention," 9 all have special
provisions for contracts of employment which deny immunity to a
foreign state employer unless the contract provides otherwise. The
reason for these provisions is recognition that in some respects a
government's relations with its employees are exclusively within
that government's own jurisdiction. 7 0 The transfer or removal of
employees, particularly senior ones, often is a matter of signifi-
cance in the government's administration.' 7 ' The writer's own ob-
servations in one African state were that such an employee's tem-
porary detention or deportation was equally significant.7 2 Citizens
of countries that allow state employers to contract out of foreign
jurisdiction will be more attractive employment candidates than
those who carry in their duffel bags the expensive delights of
American legal process.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress intended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
codify the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity. It designed
the Act to ensure that decisions on when a party could maintain an
action against a foreign state and when such a state was entitled to
immunity should be made exclusively by the courts of the United
States. The Act grants states immunity with exceptions. The com-
mercial activities exception in section 1605(a)(2) denies immunity
to states in actions which are based upon these states' commercial
activities in the United States. This provision was not intended to
encompass a state's law enforcement activity in its own territory.
167. State Immunity Act of 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
168. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 §§ 11-12, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715, 718
(1986).
169. European Convention on State Immunity, art. 5, EUROP. T.S. No. 74 (1972), re-
printed in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
170. See Crawford, supra note 29, at 92.
171. Id.
172. Personal observation based on service (without detention) as University Librarian,
University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi, 1977-1980.
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The court's inappropriate application of a jurisdictional nexus
measure in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia resulted in a holding for the
first time that a United States court had jurisdiction under section
1605(a)(2) over a claim arising from such law enforcement activity.
This result will have adverse consequences for the United States,
its citizens, and foreign nations. It should have been avoided by
following earlier courts' refusal to find a jurisdictional nexus be-
tween official acts in a nation's own territory linked to commercial
activities in the United States when the official acts have an effec-
tive, legal cause in the foreign nation.
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